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Abstract
In this paper a contest game with heterogeneous players is analyzed in which hetero-
geneity could be the consequence of past discrimination. Based on the normative
perception of the heterogeneity there are two policy options to tackle this hetero-
geneity: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative
action is implemented which compensates discriminated players. The consequences
of these two policy options are analyzed for a simple two-person contest game and it
is shown that the frequently criticized trade-off between affirmative action and total
effort does not exist: Instead, affirmative action fosters effort incentives. A general-
ization to the n-person case and to a case with a partially informed contest designer
yields the same result if the participation level is similar under each policy.
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1 Introduction
Affirmative action can be described as a policy instrument that should ameliorate
the adverse effects of discrimination on affected groups of individuals.1 Affirmative
action programs are a frequently observed policy instrument which usually gives rise
to intense public discussions in countries where those policies are in fact implemented.
One of the reasons for this controversy seems to be the fact that its implementation
goes beyond formal equal treatment considerations by addressing discriminated groups
directly which is, for example, reflected by phrases like ‘positive discrimination’, or
‘preferential treatment’ as synonyms for affirmative action. However, even in contem-
porary societies in which formal equality is legally guaranteed and executed, there
exists empirical evidence of ongoing discrimination with respect to specific minority
groups. Hence, although open discrimination is prohibited, some minority groups may
be disadvantaged out of reasons for which they cannot be held ethically responsi-
ble.2 In such cases in which formal ‘equal treatment of equals’-legislation is ineffective
because individuals are not ex-ante equal, the implementation of affirmative action
policies could be justified on ethical grounds; see Loury (1981) and Loury (2002).
However, opponents of affirmative action do not only criticize the, from their perspec-
tive, formal violation of the equal treatment principle but also they refer to potential
adverse consequences with respect to effort incentives. The following statement by
Thomas Sowell from his book “Affirmative Action Around the World” reflects the con-
cern of those opponents that there could exist a trade-off between affirmative action
(i.e. preferential treatment) and social efficiency due to potential disincentive effects
with respect to effort provision:
Both preferred and non-preferred groups can slacken their efforts - the former
because working to their fullest capacity is unnecessary and the latter because
working to their fullest capacity can prove to be futile. [...] While affirmative
action policies are often thought of, by advocates and critics alike, as a transfer
of benefits from one group to another, there can also be net losses of benefits
1Discrimination is interpreted here as a disadvantage of a group of individuals in different social
contexts that is based on some kind of exogenous marker, e. g. race, gender, or nationality, that
is (at least initially) not related to these contexts and for which the members of these groups
are personally not responsible. Alternatively, more shortly and less technical, discrimination can
be described as “allowing racial identification [or gender, nationality etc.] to have a place in an
individual´s life chances”; see Arrow (1998), p. 91.
2This persistence of discrimination could, for instance, be interpreted as the consequence of historical
discrimination that affects negatively the contemporaneous generation, e.g. if investment in
human capital depends on the historical segregation of work and living places along races; see
Lundberg (1998).
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when both groups do less than their best. What might otherwise be a zero-sum
game can thus become a negative-sum game. (Sowell (2004), p. 14)
This line of critique is also addressed in Fryer and Loury (2005a), where it is coined
‘Myth No. 3’ because “confident a priori assertions about how affirmative action
affects incentives are unfounded. Indeed, economic theory provides little guidance”
(ibid., p. ). The simple contest game in the style of Tullock (1980), introduced in the
next section, is an attempt to fill this gap in theoretical analysis by addressing the
question whether the criticized trade-off does exist in this kind of stylized model. An
affirmative answer to this question would then imply that optimizing players reduce
their respective effort levels if they face affirmative action policies which creates the
mentioned trade-off.
The implementation of affirmative action is modeled as a biased contest rule3 where
weak contestants are favored because ethical perception interprets their weakness as
being the consequence of past discrimination. The alternative perception, i. e. holding
the contestants ethically responsible for their heterogeneity, requires instead the imple-
mentation of an unbiased contest rule. Both policies are defined formally as restrictions
on the contest rule which imply different incentives for the individuals depending on
the implemented policy option. The key question is therefore how individuals react to
the distortion of incentives that is induced by the two policies.
There exists a limited number of articles with a similar focus. Fu (2006) models
college admission as a two-player all-pay auction under complete information and
shows that favoring the discriminated player to some extent induces the maximal
expected academic effort (interpreted as the expected test score) by both candidates.
A similar conclusion is derived in Schotter and Weigelt (1992) that analyze, also
experimentally, a two-player tournament with unobservable effort. However, none of
the models mentioned so far specifies the normative objective of affirmative action, i.e.
in these papers affirmative action is considered simply as a deviation from an unbiased
‘equal treatment’-policy. This is a crucial difference to the contest model presented
below because here the normative objective of affirmative action is explicitly defined
and integrated into the model.4 Kranich (1994) formalizes a similar idea for a two-
3The underlying game theoretic model is an asymmetric contest game with n heterogeneous players.
Asymmetric contest games are applied in different frameworks, for example, to analyze legal
presumption in trials; see Bernardo, Talley, and Welch (2000), with the interpretation of prior
probabilities; see Corcho´n (2000), or in a two-stage rent-seeking contest; see Leininger (1993).
4In Fryer and Loury (2005b) a model with incomplete information is introduced where a continuum
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player production economy where the jointly produced output is shared according to a
‘division rule’. He introduces a normative requirement for the class of feasible division
rules which is phrased equal-division-for-equal-work principle5 and shows that there
exist feasible division rules that satisfy this principle in combination with Pareto-
efficiency. In contest games, however, the notion of Pareto-efficiency is meaningless
because there is no production, i.e. the contested prize does not depend on the exerted
effort of the contestants. Therefore, a Pareto-ranking of the outcomes of the two
normatively defined policies is pointless in a contest game framework. Instead, the
two policy alternatives are evaluated with respect to the total equilibrium effort that
they generate.6
Contrary to Sowell´s prediction, it is shown that in the two-player contest game the
optimal individual response to the implementation of affirmative action would be to
increase individual effort level in comparison to the unbiased contest game (irrespective
of the fact whether the individual is discriminated or not). However, relaxing the
restriction on the number of players is not innocuous: the result for the two-player
case can only be sustained in the n-player contest game if the underlying heterogeneity
is not too severe because otherwise participation effects dominate incentive effects. As
the model is kept sufficiently simple to facilitate analytical tractability, it is too stylized
to give any sort of direct policy implications. Nevertheless it shows that a trade-off
between affirmative action and aggregated effort, as stated by Sowell, may not exist,
especially if participation effects are not an important issue.
The contest model is formulated in general terms to reflect in a stylized way a variety of
situations in which the implementation of affirmative action can have consequences on
the incentive structure of effort provision. Possible real world examples of contest-like
of contestants compete for positions in simultaneous pair-wise tournaments. There, the analysis
is focused on the comparison of group-sighted and group-blind affirmative action policies without
addressing explicitly the incentive effects of affirmative action versus unbiased tournament rules.
5The subsequently stated definitions of the two policies are modified versions of this principle in the
sense that they now capture the two different normative perceptions of the heterogeneity of the
contestants. Therefore, the interpretation of ‘equal work’ has a different meaning depending on
the perceived underlying reason for the heterogeneity.
6This interpretation of exerted effort as being socially valuable is the crucial difference to the ex-
tensive literature on rent-seeking contests (comp. the literature survey in Nitzan (1994) and a
collection of related articles in Lockard and Tullock (2001)). There, exerted effort is usually in-
terpreted as pure social waste, while in situations where affirmative action is applied it is more
appropriately characterized as socially valuable (which is also suggested by the quotation of Sow-
ell). In the recent literature on sport contests effort, i.e. the performance of the athletes, has a
similar interpretation; see Szymanski (2003).
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environments in which affirmative action is implemented are:7 university admission,
in which applicants compete for places in a university program by means of their high
school grade point average and minority students get some kind of bonus; fixed bonus-
payment tournaments within a firm where the bonus is payed to the employee with
the highest sales performance and discriminated employees might get some limited
advantage; and even sport contests, for example horse riding, in which jockeys that
weigh less than their competitors are forced to carry additional weight.
2 The Model
Affirmative action instruments are usually applied in situations of competitive social
interaction. The competitive structure of these situations can be captured by a contest
game in which contestants compete for an indivisible prize. The contestants can
increase their respective probability of winning the contested prize by exerting more
effort. This feature seems to be appropriate to model the basic structure of the above
mentioned examples because there exists a relatively high grade of discretion on the
side of the organizer of the competition. This is reflected in a contest game in which
contestants face a probabilistic outcome. To guarantee analytical tractability and
closed form solutions, the model is formulated under complete information, i. e. the
only element of uncertainty is the final winner of the contest.
2.1 The Contestants
LetN = {1, 2, . . . , n} denote the set of individuals that compete against each other in a
contest game. Each contestant i ∈ N exerts an effort level ei ∈ <n+ and takes the effort
level e−i = (e1, . . . , ei−1, ei+1, . . . , en) ∈ <n−1+ of its rivals as given. Additionally, it is
assumed that all contestants are risk-neutral and have the same positive valuation V
for the contested prize. The only element of heterogeneity among the contestants is the
respective ‘cost function’ that captures the disutility of exerting effort ei which depends
additionally on parameter βi that (potentially) reflects the degree of discrimination of
contestant i. It is assumed that this cost function is linear in ei and multiplicative in
βi for all i ∈ N , with βi normalized in such a way that for the most able contestant
7For empirical results with respect to the consequences of different affirmative action policies com-
pare the survey in Holzer and Neumark (2000).
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βˆ = 1 and for less able contestants β ∈
(
βˆ,∞
)
:
ci(ei) = βiei for all i ∈ N. (1)
The contestants perceive the outcome of the contest game as probabilistic. However,
they can influence the probability of winning by exerting effort, i.e. the outcome
depends on the vector of effort levels exerted by all individuals. The following Contest
Success Function (CSF), axiomatized in Clark and Riis (1998), that will be applied
in the model allows also an asymmetric treatment of the contestants that can be
interpreted as affirmative action policy:
pi(e) =
αPi e
r
i∑
j∈N αPj erj
(2)
with αPi > 0 for all i ∈ N and r ∈ (0, 1]. This function maps the vector of effort
levels e = (e1, . . . , en) into win probabilities for each contestant: pi(e) : <n+ → [0, 1].
The parameter r measures the sensitivity of the outcome of the contest game with
respect to differences in effort.8 Additionally, each individual effort level is weighted
by a positive parameter αPi that depends on the policy P , formally defined in the
next subsection. If no contestant exerts positive effort it is assumed that none of the
individuals receives the prize, i.e. pi(0, . . . , 0) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
The specification of the cost function in eq. (1) and the contest mechanism in eq. (2)
are already the necessary elements to state the following expected (additive separable)
utility function of contestant i:
ui(ei, e−i) = pi(e)V − ci(ei) for all i ∈ N. (3)
This contest game can therefore be interpreted as a standard non-cooperative game:
Γ[N,P, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ], where ei ∈ Ai and P is an additional policy parameter.
2.2 The Policy Options
It is assumed that the choice of the policy P is based on the ethical perception of
the heterogeneity of the contestants (i.e. the different marginal cost functions)9 which
directly implies the normative objective of the respective policy option and therefore
8The upper bound r ≤ 1 is imposed because otherwise the existence of pure strategy equilibria
cannot be guaranteed.
9As the model is formulated under complete information, the individual marginal cost functions are
common knowledge.
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also governs the specification of the individual effort weights (αP1 , . . . , α
P
n ). With
respect to the ethical perception of the difference in cost functions, there are two
potential interpretations for the source of this heterogeneity.
The first interpretation holds the contestants ethically responsible for their respective
cost function in which case the probability to win the contest game (i.e. the CSF)
should only depend on the vector of exerted effort. In other words, if a contestant i
exerts the same effort level as a contestant j then both contestants should win the
contest game with the same probability. This policy option would therefore treat the
contestants equally with respect to their exerted effort level.
Definition 1 A policy is called equal treatment approach (ET) if:
ei = ej ⇒ pi(e) = pj(e) for all i 6= j.
For the class of contest games as defined by the CSF in eq. (2) equal treatment implies
that the policy weights (αET1 , . . . , α
ET
n ) must be identical for all players:
αETi = α
ET for all i ∈ N.
The last line is derived by observing that for all ei = ej it has to be the case that
pi(e) = pj(e). Solving this expression according to eq. (2) for all possible values of
ei = ej yields the above specification for the weight α
ET
i for all i ∈ N .
This policy could also be interpreted as an anonymity principle because it postu-
lates that the contest success function neither depends on the specific names nor on
the exogenous characteristics of the players.10 However, the outcome, i.e. expected
equilibrium utility, of the contest game will indirectly depend on the characteristics of
the players because weaker players will exert less effort in equilibrium.
The second interpretation is based on the perception that the contestants cannot be
held ethically responsible for their heterogeneity, for instance, if it is the consequence
of past discrimination. As heterogeneity affects the cost function for each contestant,
fairness would require that two contestants that face equal disutility induced by the
chosen effort level (that could be different) should have the same probability to win
the contest game. The normative justification for this interpretation is the “moral
10In Skaperdas (1996), theorem 2, this CSF (specified by eq. (2) and the relevant ET weights) is
axiomatized based on a conventional anonymity axiom, comp. footnote 12.
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intuition that two people incurring equal disutility deserve equal rewards” (Kranich
1994, p. 178).11
Definition 2 A policy is called affirmative action (AA) if:
ci(ei) = cj(ej)⇒ pi(e) = pj(e) for all i 6= j.
For the class of contest games as defined by the CSF in eq. (2) the following relation
with respect to the policy weights (αAA1 , . . . , α
AA
n ) satisfies the definition of affirmative
action:
αAAi
βri
=
αAAj
βrj
for all i 6= j. (4)
This relation is derived by using the following transformation of variables: zi = ci(ei)
for all i ∈ N . As ci(ei) is linear it can be inverted: ei = zi/βi. For the so transformed
model the condition in Definition 2 then states that if zi = zj then pi(z/β) = pj(z/β),
where z/β = (z1/β1, . . . zn/βn) denotes the vector of transformed individual effort.
Solving pi(z/β) = pj(z/β) for zi = zj implies that: α
AA
i (zi/βi)
r = αAAj (zi/βj)
r which
has to hold for all values zi = zj. This condition is satisfied if the above mentioned
relation holds. The following normalization simplifies the subsequent analysis. As the
CSF is homogeneous of degree zero, there is no loss in generality if the weights are
normalized such that:
αAAi = β
r
i for all i ∈ N. (5)
The policy AA therefore generates a bias12 of the contest success function in favor of
discriminated contestants in such a way that both contestants have the same probabil-
ity of winning the contest whenever they face the same disutility of effort. Note that
this definition requires that the affirmative action bias is implemented multiplicatively
through αAAi which increases the marginal efficiency of exerted effort for contestant i
and therefore changes the incentives for effort distribution. This type of affirmative
11This quotation from Kranich (1994) justifies a related ‘equal-division-for-equal-work’ principle in his
model. The difference to the model presented here is that ‘equal work’ should be interpreted here
as equal disutility of effort as this is the relevant normative standard of comparison if contestants
are not responsible for the differences in marginal costs.
12In Clark and Riis (1998) it is argued that the anonymity axiom of Skaperdas (1996) should be re-
laxed because “in many situations, however, contestants are treated differently (due to affirmative
action programs for instance)” (Clark and Riis 1998, p. 201). The resulting CSF is asymmetric
as in eq. (2) but without any further specification of this asymmetry. Definition 2 can therefore
also be interpreted as a substitute of the anonymity axiom that entails now a specific normative
restriction with respect to the asymmetry of the CSF.
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action also has an interesting normative interpretation as shown in a more general
framework in Calsamiglia (2004). There, it is justified normatively because it equal-
izes ‘reward to effort’ which guarantees a notion of ‘global equality of opportunity’.13
Both policies, ET and AA, can be considered as principles that guarantee a notion
of procedural fairness because they are defined with respect to the outcome (in the
sense of winning probabilities) of the contest game. An alternative (welfaristic) ap-
proach would be to equalize the expected equilibrium utilities as objective of affir-
mative action. This alternative interpretation is discussed in Section 6 where it is
also shown that the resulting affirmative action bias is identical under both normative
interpretations.
In the introduction it was already remarked that the difference between the contest
game presented here and the literature on rent-seeking is based on the assumption
that exerting effort is perceived as socially valuable (and not as social loss). This
is also implicitly reflected by the citation of Sowell in which less effort of all partic-
ipants is interpreted as socially inferior. Therefore, the positive analysis of the two
normative policy options is carried out by simply comparing the sum of equilibrium
effort that each policy induces (interpreted as a measure of ‘social efficiency’). Us-
ing total equilibrium effort as the standard of comparison seems to be appropriate
because in situations in which affirmative action is potentially implemented, this as-
sumption captures the notion of social loss (or gain).14 The equilibrium effort level
of each contestant will depend on the ex-ante announced policy parameter P and the
standard of comparison will therefore be expressed and denoted in the following way:
E∗P =
∑
i∈N e∗i (P ) for P ∈ {ET,AA}.
13Global equality of opportunity in a contest framework is defined as equality of welfare achieved
for individuals that compete in several contests simultaneously and where the respective contest
organizers implement affirmative action that is based on local information which is limited to the
respective contest.
14In the college admission example, the education authorities are interested in high effort levels, i.e.
grades, by all students that are possibly affected by affirmative action irrespective of the fact that
they are admitted. Also in the bonus tournaments the employer is obviously interested in high
effort levels by all employees, irrespective of the identity of the final winner (the interpretation of
this kind of tournament as an incentive device is obvious here). And even in sport competitions
it can be argued that spectators are interested in the overall performance of all athletes because
ex-ante predictable sport competitions are usually perceived as boring. Note that also the quo-
tation by Sowell suggests that the effort of the individuals can be simply summed up to evaluate
affirmative action.
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As the objectives and the entailed bias of the two policy options are clarified now, the
timing of the complete contest game can be summarized in the following way: The
heterogeneity of the contestants (i.e. different marginal cost parameters) is observed.
Based on the ethical perception of this observation a policy option P ∈ {ET,AA}
is selected that determines the weighting parameters (αP1 , . . . , α
P
n ) for the respective
policy. The contestants exert the optimal (with respect to their expected utility)
equilibrium effort level e∗i (P ) for each i ∈ N , taking as given the effort levels of their
rivals and the relevant weights induced by policy P . In the last step the exerted
efforts are observed and the winner of the contest game is determined according to the
announced policy option. After that the total equilibrium effort that is generated by
each policy can be compared which directly answers the question whether a trade-off
between affirmative action and total effort does in fact exist or not.
3 The Two-Player Contest Game
Restricting the number of contestants in the two player case yields the key result of
the comparative policy analysis: in equilibrium both contestants will exert more effort
under AA than under ET. Contrary to the n-player contest game this result holds
without any extra assumption and the derivation of equilibrium in the two-player
contest is based on simple first order conditions.15 Therefore, the two-player contest
game is analyzed separately.
Applying the CSF as specified in eq. (2), the expected utility function for policy
P ∈ {ET,AA} can be expressed as:
ui(ei, ej) =
αPi e
r
i
αP1 e
r
1 + α
P
2 e
r
2
V − βiei for i = 1, 2;
where contestant 1 is assumed to be the one with the lowest marginal cost parameter
such that β1 = 1 and β2 > 1. By Definition 1 and 2 the bias for contestant 1 is
normalized to αP1 = 1 for P ∈ {ET,AA}. Solving first order conditions for a given
policy parameter P yields the equilibrium effort candidate for i = 1, 2:
e∗i (P ) =
αP1 α
P
2 β
r−1
i β
r
j
(αP1 β
r
2 + α
P
2 β
r
1)
2
rV for i 6= j, (6)
that would imply positive expected equilibrium utility by the assumption on r:
ui(e
∗
i (P ), e
∗
j(P )) =
(αPi β
r
j )
2 + αP1 α
P
2 (β1β2)
r(1− r)
(αP1 β2 + α
P
2 β1)
2
V > 0. (7)
15Nti (1999) is based on a similar set-up with a non-biased CSF in a rent-seeking framework where
heterogeneity does affect individual valuations instead of marginal costs.
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A non-interior equilibrium in which a contestant exerts zero effort cannot exist because
there always exists a profitable deviation for one of the contestants.16 The second order
conditions can be expressed in the following way:
∂2ui(ei, ej)
∂e2i
=
αP1 α
P
2 rV e
2r−2
i e
r
j
(αP1 e
r
1 + α
P
2 e
r
2)
3
[
αPj (r − 1)
(
ej
ei
)r
− αPi (r + 1)
]
< 0,
which proves concavity by the assumption on r. Hence, the equilibrium is interior and
unique. From eq. (6) it can also be noted that the relative equilibrium effort levels
are independent of the implemented policy because:
e∗1(P )
e∗2(P )
= β for P ∈ {ET,AA} . (8)
The two policy alternatives ET and AA can now be evaluated with respect to the
sum of equilibrium effort E∗P =
∑
i=1,2 e
∗
i (P ) that each policy generates. The following
Proposition states the result for the two-player contest game: The affirmative action
policy as specified in Definition 2 will induce higher individual and also higher aggregated
effort than the equal treatment policy. This result refutes the above mentioned critique
of affirmative action policy because in the contest game as specified here a trade-off
between affirmative action and aggregate effort does not exist.
Proposition 1 In the two-player contest game (i) the sum of equilibrium effort, and
(ii) each individual equilibrium effort level is higher under policy AA than under the
policy ET.
Proof : Using eq. (6) and Definition 1 and 2, the inequality E∗AA > E
∗
ET can be
reduced to rV
4
β2+1
β2
>
rV βr2
(1+βr2)
2
β2+1
β2
, which is always satisfied because it can be simplified
to (1− βr2)2 > 0. This establishes part (i) of the Proposition.
Using the fact that the relation between the equilibrium effort levels remains constant,
as stated in eq. (8), proves part (ii).
The reason for this at first sight surprising result lies in the fact that the implemen-
tation of the AA policy yields a contest game that is more balanced with respect to
the characteristics of the contestants (the heterogeneity of the contestants is reduced
16If both contestants would exert zero effort a deviating player i will always win the contest with
certainty by exerting a slightly positive effort level : ui(, 0) > ui(0, 0) = 0. If only one contestant
j would exert zero effort player i can deviate profitably by decreasing his chosen effort level by a
small amount  because then he still wins the contest game with certainty: ui(ei− , 0) > ui(ei, 0)
as long as ei −  > 0.
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by the biased CSF). As the contestants are more similar under AA, the competitive
pressure is higher which implies higher equilibrium effort by both contestants.17
In fact, the bias that is induced by AA for the two-person contest game yields a
level playing field, i.e. the contestants are as similar as possible under this set-up.
Therefore, the policy AA also generates the maximal aggregated effort even for a
contest game that is not restricted by any normative constraint. In other words, if the
objective would solely be the maximization of total equilibrium effort by implementing
an appropriate weight αˆ2 then this weight would coincide with the bias that is required
by the AA policy.18
Proposition 2 The policy option AA generates the maximal sum of equilibrium effort
in the two-player contest game.
Proof : Consider the sum of equilibrium effort for an arbitrary parameter α2 that favors
the discriminated contestant: E∗ = α2β
r
2
(α2+βr2)
2
β2+1
β2
rV . This expression is maximized for
αˆ2 = β
r
2 which coincides with α
AA
i = β
r
i for i = 1, 2.
Opponents of affirmative action policies claim that those policies could result in less
aggregated effort level. The last two propositions reveal that in the above specified
two-player contest this concern is not justified. Instead, both contestants will exert
higher effort levels in equilibrium if they face affirmative action. In fact, as it was
shown in proposition 3, the affirmative action bias even leads to the highest possible
level of total equilibrium effort. In the next section it is analyzed if these results are
also valid for contest games with more than two players.
4 The n-Player Contest Game
Contrary to the two-player case the derivation of the equilibrium and the proof of
existence and uniqueness for the n-player contest game are more involved because
not all contestants will always exert a strictly positive effort level in equilibrium.19
17Similar results are known, for example, from the literature on optimal auction design: A revenue
maximizing auction implies also the favoring of weak bidders (comp. McAfee and McMillan 1989).
18Nti (2004) introduces a 2-player contest game with different valuations and a CSF of the form
pi(e) = αiei+γi∑
i=1,2
αiei+γi
. In this set-up, total equilibrium effort is maximized if γ1 = γ2 = 0 and
the multiplicative parameters (α1, α2) balance the heterogeneity of the valuations.
19This implies that first-order conditions that were used in the two-player contest to characterize the
equilibrium are not feasible here because the equilibrium might be non-interior. The approach
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Additionally, an assumption is needed in the n-player contest because for a non-linear
CSF with parameter r < 1 it is not possible to derive closed form solutions.20 As the
existence of closed form solutions is crucial for the comparative analysis of the policy
alternatives, it is assumed from now on that the CSF is linear with r = 1.
The expected utility of the risk-neutral contestant i in the n-player contest can then
be expressed as:
ui(ei, e−i) =
αPi ei∑
j∈N αPj ej
V − βiei for all i ∈ N and for P ∈ {ET,AA} . (9)
It is also assumed that the contestants are ordered with respect to their marginal cost
parameter: β1 ≤ β2 ≤ . . . ≤ βn with the normalization β1 = 1.
The equilibrium of this contest game will be derived in appendix A.1, based on the ob-
servation that the contest game can be interpreted as an aggregative game with its con-
venient properties. The following equation provides an expression of the equilibrium
effort for those m contestants of the set M ⊆ N that are active, i.e. that exert a
positive equilibrium effort:
e∗i (P ) =
1
αPi
1− βi
αPi
(m− 1)∑
j∈M
βj
αPj
 (m− 1)V∑
j∈M
βj
αPj
for all i ∈M and P ∈ {ET,AA} . (10)
Set M is indirectly defined by the following inequality:
(m− 1) βi
αPi
<
∑
j∈M
βj
αPj
for all i ∈M and P ∈ {ET,AA} . (11)
Using the specification of the weights for the AA and ET policy and the charac-
terization of the active set, the following Lemma describes the set of participating
contestants for each policy option.
Lemma 1 Under the policy ET the active set M ⊆ N of contestants is implicitly
defined by the following inequality:
(m− 1)βi <
∑
j∈M
βj for all i ∈M. (12)
Under policy AA all contestants will be active.
that is instead applied is based on the notion of ‘share functions’ as defined in Cornes and Hartley
(2005) which has the advantage that the existence proof of equilibrium is reduced to a simple
fixed point argument in <2.
20Cornes and Hartley (2005) give existence results for this class of games by analyzing the properties
of implicit equilibrium conditions. They also show that total equilibrium effort is increasing in r.
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As equilibrium effort is given by eq. (10), the two policies can now be compared
with respect to the aggregated equilibrium effort E∗P =
∑
i∈M e∗i (P ) that they induce.
However, Lemma 1 already reveals that the comparison between the two policy options
will not be as straight forward as in the two-player contest game because the total
equilibrium effort depends on the distribution of the cost parameter that determines
the active set.
The following notation will simplify the characterization of the relevant distribution for
a subset J ⊆ N of contestants: the arithmetic mean of the cost parameters of agents
of set J will be denoted as β¯J =
1
j
∑
i∈J βi (where β¯ = β¯N to facilitate notation), and
the harmonic mean respectively as: βHJ =
[
1
j
∑
i∈J
1
βi
]−1
.
The subsequent proposition states the condition under which policy AA generates
higher aggregated effort.
Proposition 3 In the n-player contest game the sum of equilibrium effort levels is
higher under policy AA than under policy ET if:
β¯M
βHN
>
m−1
m
n−1
n
. (13)
Proof : Calculation of the sum of equilibrium effort for each policy under consideration
of lemma 1 yields E∗AA =
n−1
n2
V
∑
i∈N
1
βi
and E∗ET =
m−1∑
i∈M βi
V . Reformulating the
inequality E∗AA > E
∗
ET leads to condition (13).
The following intuitive explanation is provided for the condition in Proposition 3 which
is afterwards clarified by a numerical example. As already observed in the two-player
contest game, AA in general induces higher competitive pressure because contestants
are more similar than under ET. Increasing the number of active contestants therefore
yields higher total effort for both policies because this implies more intense compe-
tition. However, inducing heavily discriminated contestants to participate comes at
a non-negligible cost, especially for the AA policy because by lemma 1 all partici-
pants will be active under AA. This effect is less profound for ET because highly
discriminated contestant will not participate under ET.
Numerical Example: Consider the following contest game with three contestants that
have marginal costs of (β1, β2, β3) = (1, 2, 2). The underlying dispersion is measured
by the coefficient of variation (defined as CV = σ(β)/β¯) which is in this case CV ≈
0.2828. For these parameters AA will generate E∗AA ≈ 0.4444 that is higher than the
aggregated effort under ET which is E∗ET = 0.4. If a fourth contestant with β4 = 2.43
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(which yields nearly the same level of dispersion CV ≈ 0.2828) is added the difference
between AA and ET becomes even more profound: E∗AA ≈ 0.4522 versus E∗ET ≈ 0.4038
and E∗AA − E∗ET ≈ 0.0483. Note also that both policies induce higher total effort in
comparison with the three player example. However, if the fourth contestant is highly
discriminated (β4 = 10) this would imply a decline of total effort in the case of AA:
E∗AA ≈ 0.3938. This decline is less intense in case of ET because here the fourth player
will not participate. As only the first three contestants will be active under ET, the
result is identical to the three player contest game considered before, i.e. E∗ET = 0.4.
Comparing both values shows that for this four player constellation the result of the
policy analysis has been reversed because now E∗AA < E
∗
ET .
This example demonstrates that the key factor for the outcome of the policy compari-
son is the distribution of the discrimination parameter in combination with the number
of contestants. In general it can be stated that either a low number of contestants or a
sufficient low dispersion makes it more probable that AA will induce more total effort
than ET because then the set of active contestants tends to be similar for both poli-
cies.21 The exact relation between the distribution of discrimination parameters and
the number of players is described by the inequality22 in Proposition 3 in combination
with the characterization of the active set in Eq. (11).
An additional remark with respect to the relation between Proposition 1 and 3 should
be in order. Applying Proposition 3 to a two-player contest game would yield the same
result as Proposition 1 because condition (13) holds irrespective of the distribution of
cost parameters in the two-player case: For the optimally designed vector of policy
parameters both contestants will exert positive equilibrium effort, i.e. set M and N
coincide. Therefore, Proposition (3) is satisfied without further restriction because
condition (13) can be reduced to β¯ > βHN which is always true (comp. the proof for
Proposition 4).
For the two-player contest game Proposition 1 also contained a statement that com-
21The observation that affirmative action might imply a distortion of the participation decision of
individuals (which could finally dominate the effect of increased competitive pressure) has also
empirical relevance: In an econometric analysis of bid preferences in highway procurement auctions
(Marion 2007), it is shown that preferential treatment implies a decline in competitive pressure
because non-preferred bidders switched to procurement auctions without bid preference program.
22Note, that the left hand side of condition (13) is lower than one for m small and larger than one
for m large (where m is determined according to condition (11)). Inspection of the right hand
side reveals that it is always lower or equal to one. This confirms the qualitative statement that
condition (13) is likely to hold if the number of contestants is relatively small or the distribution
is not too dispersed.
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pares individual equilibrium effort under each policy. However, a comparable result
for the n-player contest is not possible because the set of active agents depends on the
underlying distribution of the marginal cost parameter. Hence, the additional assump-
tion of full participation by all contestants under both policies shall be considered to
get some further insights into the individual equilibrium behavior. This assumption
would imply that the dispersion of cost parameters is sufficiently low such that also
under policy ET all contestant would be active.
The following Proposition mirrors Proposition 1 for this class of restricted distributions
of the marginal cost parameter. Although the sum of equilibrium effort in this special
case is higher under the optimal AA policy versus the optimal ET policy (without
any further conditions) as in the two-player case, the result with respect to individual
equilibrium effort is different: In the n-player contest game the set of contestants
that individually exert higher equilibrium effort under policy AA than under ET is
restricted to contestants with either very low marginal cost or higher than average
marginal cost.
Proposition 4 If all contestants in the n-person contest game are active under policy
ET, then (i) the sum of equilibrium effort levels is higher under policy AA, and (ii)
the individual equilibrium effort of all contestants with marginal cost parameter β ∈[
1, 1
n−1 β¯
)
∪
(
β¯, n
n−1 β¯
)
is higher under policy AA, while it is lower for contestants with
β ∈
(
1
n−1 β¯, β¯
)
. For contestants with β ∈
{
1
n−1 β¯, β¯
}
the individual equilibrium effort
is the same under both policies.
Proof : If all contestants are active setM and N coincide, and condition (13) simplifies
to β¯ > βHN . This inequality is always satisfied which proves the first part of the
proposition.
For the second part the following inequality has to be analyzed: e∗i (AA) > e
∗
i (ET ).
Simplifying this expression yields after some algebra the following inequality:∑
j∈N
βj
2 − n2βi
∑
j∈N
βj − (n− 1)βi)
 > 0. (14)
This inequality is satisfied if βi ∈
[
1, 1
n−1 β¯
)
, where the lower bound stems from the
assumption that βi ≥ 1 for all i ∈ N , or if βi ∈
(
β¯, n
n−1 β¯
)
, where the upper bound
comes from the assumption of full participation under the optimal ET policy. The left
hand side of Eq. (14) is equal to zero for β ∈
{
1
n−1 β¯, β¯
}
. Continuity of the left hand
side of Eq. (14) in βi implies the condition for the reversed inequality. Note also that
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the first interval could be empty if n−1 > β¯ which depends on the relevant underlying
distribution. 
The set of contestants that individually exert more effort under the AA policy is not
connected. The following argumentation provides an intuition for this result: Consider
first a (potentially hypothetical) contestant k with a marginal cost that is identical to
the mean of the total distribution: βk = β¯. Under policy AA this would imply that
contestant k is favored by αAAk = β¯. Normalizing the vector (α
AA
1 , . . . , α
AA
n ) yields
the equivalent vector α′ = (αAA1 /β¯, . . . , α
AA
n /β¯). For contestant k this would imply
no distortion under AA because α′k = α
AA
k /β¯ = 1. Additionally, he knows that under
AA contestants with higher marginal costs than him are favored (in average) to the
same amount as contestants with lower marginal costs are handicapped. Therefore,
his equilibrium effort level is not altered. Contestants with higher marginal costs than
contestant k are favored under α′, i.e. their efficiency of effort in the CSF is increased
(α′i > 1 for i > k) which implies that they exert higher effort level. The contrary is
true for contestants with less marginal cost than contestant k: they are handicapped
(α′i < 1 for i < k) which reduces their efficiency of effort and therefore also their
equilibrium effort. However, there exists a counter effect for contestants with very low
marginal cost which becomes dominant for some cut-off value. This counter effect is
due to increasing competitive pressure for those highly effective contestants because
they are more handicapped under AA than their competitors. The cut-off marginal
cost value is exactly at βc ≡ β¯/(n− 1). Contestants that have a lower cost parameter
than contestant c will therefore exert higher equilibrium effort under AA than under
ET.
5 An Extension: Group Contests
In the last section the implementation of the AA policy was based on a bias of the
CSF that was individually specified for each contestant. However, the implementation
of affirmative action policies is usually not based on individual characteristics, but
on group membership, e.g. minority, sex, race etc. Reasons for this phenomenon
could be incomplete information with respect to individual discrimination, or simply
the fact that group members are sufficiently homogeneous to treat them identical.
In the following section the latter aspect is analyzed while in the next section the
informational requirements of the contest designer are relaxed.
The following model is a simplified version of the n-player contest game with the
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additional assumption that the n contestants belong either to group A or B that each
consists of nA ≥ 2 and nB ≥ 2 members. The members of each group are assumed
to be identical, i.e. face the same marginal cost parameter which is normalized for
the non-discriminated group A such that βi = βA = 1 for all i ∈ A and βi = βB for
all i ∈ B where βB > 1. It should be emphasized that this specification is already
covered by the model of section 4 which implies that αETi = α
ET and αAAi = βi
for all i ∈ N . The main objective is therefore another clarification of Proposition 3
and the interplay between total effort and the active set of contestants. Additionally,
the simplified model presented here can be considered as the starting point of the
generalized model in the next section.
At first, the active set under the optimally designed vector parameters for the ET
policy has to be determined (for AA all contestants will always be active). Denote
the number of active contestants of A by mA, and mB for group B. Starting with
the less discriminated group A, it is obvious that all members of A are active because
condition (11) reduces to 1 < mA
mA−1 which is trivially satisfied for all mA ≤ nA. Hence,
all members of group A will be active under ET.
Considering the members of group B, condition 11 becomes βB <
nA+mBβB
nA+mB−1 which can
be simplified to:
βB <
nA
nA − 1 . (15)
Notice that the last condition does not depend on mB anymore which implies that this
condition either holds for all or for none of the members of B. Based on the number
of group A-members and the marginal cost parameter of group B the following two
cases are possible:
1. If condition (15) is satisfied both groups are active under ET.
2. Otherwise, only members of group A are active under ET.
Based on these two cases the aggregated equilibrium effort level under the optimal
designed vector of policy parameters under policy AA and ET can now be compared.
In case 1 all contestants are active such that Proposition 4 can be used directly to
conclude that AA induces higher aggregated effort than ET. The same proposition
gives conditions for each discrimination level under which AA induces more individual
equilibrium effort than ET. As βA = 1 and βB > β¯ this implies that βA ∈
[
1, 1
n−1 β¯
)
,
βB ∈
(
β¯, n
n−1 β¯
)
, and that there exists no contestant i such that βi ∈
[
1
n−1 β¯, β¯
]
.
However, it remains to be checked whether the first interval is non-empty, i.e. if
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1 < 1
n−1 β¯ or not. This inequality is satisfied if βB > ((nA + nB)
2 − 2nA)/nB − 1. If
this is the case, all individuals will individually exert higher equilibrium effort under
AA. Otherwise, only group B members will increase their individual effort.
For the second case Proposition 3 is applicable, which provides condition (13) to com-
pare the aggregated equilibrium effort23 under the optimal specified policy parameters
for AA and ET. This condition simplifies for the contest game considered here to the
following expression:
βB <
nA(nA + nB − 1)
nA(nA + nB − 2)− nB ≡ β
∗. (16)
The intuitive explanation that was given in the last section is that condition 13 is likely
to hold if either the level of dispersion is sufficiently low or the number of contestants
is relatively small. For the case considered here this can be verified explicitly for
the simplified condition given in Eq. (16). In fact, it is satisfied if either βB is low in
comparison to β∗ (which coincides with low dispersion), or if nA and nB are sufficiently
low (it can be checked that β∗ is decreasing in nA and nB).
It should also be noticed that condition (16) is not trivial in the sense that, for instance,
satisfying condition (15) automatically implies condition (16) because it can be shown
that β∗ > nA
nA−1 . Hence, there are cases in which it is possible that, although not all
contestants are active, the sum of equilibrium effort is higher under AA than under
ET.
5.1 A Partially Informed Contest Organizer
In this section the previous contest game with groups is generalized by relaxing the
assumption on homogeneity within groups and on complete information of the contest
organizer with respect to individual characteristics of the contestants. From now on the
contestants again face different individual marginal costs that are common knowledge
for the contestants. However, the contest designer is only partially informed about
the heterogeneity of the contestants because, by assumption, she can only observe
the group membership of each contestant and is supposed to know an aggregated
measure of heterogeneity given by β¯A =
1
nA
∑
j∈A βj for all contestants in group A and
β¯B =
1
nB
∑
j∈B βj for all contestants in group B, respectively. Group B is assumed to
23Proposition 3 does not mention individual equilibrium effort. For the simple contest game analyzed
here, the analytical solutions for individual equilibrium effort can be compared easily to show that
members of group A exert individually less effort under AA than under ET while members of
group B trivially exert more (because they are not active under ET).
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be weaker in aggregated terms: β¯B > β¯A.
The specification of the equal treatment policy (Definition 1) for this framework re-
mains as before (αETi = α
ET for all i ∈ N) because it is defined for all contestants
identically (and therefore also irrespective of group membership). However, the defi-
nition of affirmative action has to be adapted to the limited informational knowledge
of the contest organizer because Definition 2 is based on complete information. As the
contest organizer can only observe group membership, she is restricted to compensate
only for the aggregated (group-specific) level of discrimination. Definition 2 has to be
revised respectively where the normative justification remains as in Section 2.
Definition 3 A policy is called affirmative action (AA’) in a contest game with
a partially informed contest designer if:
β¯Aei = β¯Bej ⇒ pi(e) = pj(e) for i ∈ A, j ∈ B. (17)
The following transformation of variables which respects now the limited information
of the contest organizer is useful to proceed in the same line as in the discussion of
Definition 2: zi = β¯iei where β¯i can only take two values: β¯i = β¯A for i ∈ A and
β¯i = β¯B for i ∈ B. The requirement formalized in Eq. (17) then implies that for all
zi = zj it must be true that pi(e) = pj(e) for i ∈ A and j ∈ B. Using the linear CSF as
in Eq. 2 with r = 1 yields then the following specification of weights (αAA
′
1 , . . . , α
AA′
n ):
αAA
′
i = β¯i for all i ∈ {A,B} . (18)
An alternative interpretation of this limited information case would be to assume two
sources for the heterogeneity of the contestants: one, for which the contestants are not
held responsible (i.e. the discrimination of group B as a whole with βB > βA), and
a second individual one for which the contestants are held ethically responsible. An
example would be the following cost function: ci(ei) = (βA+γi)ei if i ∈ A (analogously
for i ∈ B) where the idiosyncratic parameter γi could be positive or negative.24 The
objective of affirmative action is then limited to balance solely the difference between
βA and βB and not the differences between all the individual parameters γi for all
i ∈ N .25
The comparison between policy ET and AA’ is complex for this kind of set-up because
not all contestants will always be active under AA’ (Lemma 1 does not hold anymore
24With this kind of cost function, where βi = β¯A+γi, it is generally not the case that β¯A =
∑
i∈A βi.
However, the important point is thatβ¯A is known by the contest organizer.
25I thank Caterina Calsamiglia for suggesting this interpretation.
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in this framework), i.e. there might be distributions where for each policy option
different sets of contestants are active. A condition that guarantees that the sum
of equilibrium effort is higher under AA’ than under ET (parallel to Proposition 3)
would depend on the number of active contestants under each policy options and on
the underlying distribution of marginal cost parameters in both groups.26
To reduce the complexity of the policy comparison, the same special case as in the last
section shall be considered, i.e. it is assumed that all contestants are active under both
policy options. This implies the analysis is restricted to distributions with a sufficiently
low degree of dispersion such that condition (11) is satisfied for all contestants under
ET and AA’. As each contestant takes the effort level of the competitors as given, the
aggregated equilibrium effort can be calculated as usually, i.e. E∗P =
∑
i∈N ei(P ) for
P = {ET,AA′}. The following result about the consequences of optimal affirmative
action AA’ is possible:
Proposition 5 If all contestants are active under policy ET and AA’ in a contest
game with a partially informed contest organizer, then (i) the sum of equilibrium effort
levels is higher under AA’ than under ET , and (ii) the individual equilibrium effort
is higher under AA’ than under ET for all contestants i ∈ A with discrimination level
βi∈A <
n
(n− 1)
β¯Aβ¯
(β¯ + β¯A)
and for all contestants i ∈ B with discrimination level
βi∈B <
n
(n− 1)
β¯Bβ¯
(β¯ + β¯B)
Proof : For the first part the following inequality has to be analyzed: E∗AA′ > E
∗
ET . If all
contestants are active, this inequality is reduced to: nA/β¯A + nB/β¯B > n
2/(
∑
i∈N βi).
This inequality can be further reduced to nAnB(β¯A−β¯B)2 > 0 which is always satisfied
by assumption.
For the second part the individual equilibrium effort has to be compared. Starting
with a member of group A, the inequality e∗i∈A(AA
′) > e∗i∈A(ET ) can be reduced to
βi∈A <
(nA+nB)β¯Aβ¯
(nA+nB−1)(β¯+β¯A) with the analogous derivation for members of group B.
26The condition for E∗AA′ > E
∗
ET is in fact:
β¯MAA′
βHMET
>
mET − 1
mET
mAA′
mAA′ − 1
where MP denotes the active set under policy P ∈ {ET,AA′}. As the characterization of the
active set will now depend on the distribution of each group and also its interrelation, an intuitive
interpretation of this condition seems to be overly complex and is therefore omitted.
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Proposition 5 is intuitive because policy AA’ also levels the playing field in an aggrega-
tive sense: although contestants might not win the contest game if they exert identical
effort under AA’, the heterogeneity between the groups is lower under AA’ than under
ET because the discriminated group is favored in the average. This ameliorates the
disincentive effects due to the differences in cost functions for the two groups. The
assumption on full participation implies then increased competitive pressure between
the two groups which is translated to higher aggregated equilibrium effort.
However, contrary to the full information case individual equilibrium effort increases
only for those contestants whose marginal costs are below a specific cut-off parameter.
The reason is that under policy AA’ higher discrimination does not imply a higher
bias in favor of affected contestants proportional to their level of discrimination (as it
is the case under policy AA with a fully informed contest organizer). Therefore, policy
AA’ remains relative ineffective for those contestants with high level of discrimination.
However, under AA’ higher competitive pressure in the aggregate also has incentive
augmenting effects for contestants with relatively low marginal costs that will increase
equilibrium effort under AA’. The exact threshold level for those group of contestants
is given by the two inequalities in Proposition 5.
6 An Alternative Definition of Affirmative Action
The two policy option specified in Definition 1 and 2 are formulated with respect to
the CSF in the sense that a specific constellation of effort and marginal cost parameter
for two contestants should yield a similar probability of winning the contest game. As
the outcome of the contest game is the relevant equalisandum, those definitions can be
described as procedural notions of fairness. However, an alternative end-state notion
of fairness would be focused instead on equality of expected equilibrium utility. In
the case of affirmative action policy it could be alternatively argued that the outcome
of the contest game for each individual should reflect the ethical perception of the
heterogeneity in the following sense: if the contestants are perceived to be different
because they are discriminated (for which they cannot be held ethically responsible)
then the contest outcome should be as if they would be de facto homogenous. Hence,
the expected utility in equilibrium should be identical for all contestants. This gives
rise to the following alternative ‘end-state notion’ of affirmative action:
Definition 4 A policy is called affirmative action with respect to expected
equilibrium utilities (AU) if the expected utility for each contestant in the contest
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game is identical in equilibrium:
ui(e
∗
i (AU), e
∗
−i(AU)) = uj(e
∗
j(AU), e
∗
−j(AU)) for all i 6= j. (19)
The equilibrium utility for the two-player contest is derived in Eq. (7). For the
n-player contest with linear CSF it is
• for all active contestants i ∈M : u∗i (e∗i (P ), e∗−i(P )) =
1− βi
αPi
(m−1)∑
j∈M
βi
αP
i
2 ,
• for all non-active contestants i /∈M : u∗i (e∗i (P ), e∗−i(P )) = 0.
Condition (19) immediately implies that the set of non-active contestants must be
empty, i.e. all contestants will be active under AU. Closer inspection of the expression
for equilibrium utility for the two- and n-player contest also reveals that condition
(19) is satisfied if αAUi = β
r
i for all i ∈ N which coincides directly with policy AA.
Hence, the different interpretations of the normative objective of affirmative action do
not yield different policies for the class of contest games considered here.
7 Concluding Remarks
The implementation of affirmative action policies is a highly controversial topic in
public policy discussion. One of the frequent critical remarks is focused on the poten-
tial disincentives for effort contribution that could be generated by affirmative action
policies. It is argued that there might exist discouraging effects on targeted and non-
targeted groups that could finally imply a reduction of effort levels.
This claim is analyzed for a stylized contest game where contestants could be hetero-
geneous because of past discrimination. If this is the case then, from a normative
perspective, the contest rule should be biased in favor of discriminated contestants to
induce a level playing field. This affirmative action bias is implemented through the
specification of different individual effort weights that are tailored to the individual
discrimination parameter of each contestant in such a way that the normative objective
is satisfied. At the same time the biased contest rule leads to a change in the incentive
structure of the game that affects the optimal effort choice by each contestant. Hence,
the consequences of the implementation of affirmative action can be analyzed with
respect to the equilibrium effort that this policy induces. Using this approach it can
be shown that for the two-player contest game a trade-off between affirmative action
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and aggregated effort does not only not exist but that both objectives are also closely
related. The result for the n-players case and the case with a partially informed contest
designer is not as straight-forward: a trade-off is unlikely to exist if the participation
decision of the contestants is not altered substantively through the implementation of
the affirmative action policy. The results for the individual comparison of equilibrium
effort are highly dependent on the distribution of the discrimination parameters.
However, the general idea of how the implementation of affirmative action affects
the incentives with respect to effort contribution can be summarized in the following
way:27 Discrimination is a source of heterogeneity between individuals in competitive
situations. The implementation of appropriate affirmative action ameliorates (at least
in the aggregate) this heterogeneity and makes individuals more similar. This increases
competitive pressure and therefore induces higher effort by all participants. However,
this argumentation only works if discriminated individuals are in fact the weak ones,28
if they are identifiable, and if participation effects are not too important. If these
requirements are satisfied the critique that affirmative action instruments have disin-
centivating effects on contestants and therefore adverse consequences for total effort
seems to be unjustified.
A Appendix
A.1 Equilibrium in the n-Player Contest Game
To construct the share function of contestant i, his expected utility function has to
be transformed in such a way that the contest can be interpreted as an aggregative
game in which the utility function of contestant i can be expressed as pii(zi, Z), where
Z =
∑
i∈N zi. Consider the following transformation that yields a transformed utility
function that is strategically equivalent to Eq. (9): denote zi = α
P
i ei which can be
27This argumentation must not be restricted to the specific model of contest games considered here.
In fact, in Che (2000) it is shown that the effort reducing effect of asymmetries, the so called
‘preemption’ effect, also exists for difference-form contests that include all-pay auctions as a
special case.
28In a previous version of this paper the contestants were also heterogeneous with respect to valuation
for which they were held ethically responsible. In this case the result in Proposition 2 only holds
if discriminated players are sufficiently weak because otherwise the preferential treatment of dis-
criminated players with high valuation would increase the de-facto heterogeneity (a phenomenon
which is also coined ‘reverse discrimination’).
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inverted to ei = zi/α
P
i for all i ∈ N . The resulting transformed expected utility
function for contestant i, which has the aggregative game property, has then the
following form:
pii(zi, Z) =
zi
Z
− δPi zi for all i ∈ N and for P ∈ {ET,AA} (20)
where δPi =
βi
αPi V
and Z defined as above. This transformed contest game is now
covered by the model in Cornes and Hartley (2005). The share function can therefore
be constructed in an analogous way by deriving the first order condition:
zi
(
Z − zi
Z2
− δPi
)
= 0 for zi ≥ 0. (21)
The best response z∗i of player i can be expressed in terms of the aggregated equilibrium
effort:29 z∗i (Z) = max{Z − δPi Z2, 0}. Finally, define player i’s share function as her
relative contribution
si(Z) =
z∗i (Z)
Z
= max{1− δPi Z, 0}. (22)
In equilibrium the aggregated effort Z∗ is implicitly defined by the condition that the
individual share functions sum up to one:
S(Z∗) =
∑
i∈N
si(Z
∗) = 1 (23)
Theorem 1 in Cornes and Hartley (2005) states that a solution to this equation exists
and is unique by observing that the aggregated share function S(Z) is continuous
and strictly decreasing for positive Z, and that it has a value higher than one for Z
sufficiently small and equal to zero for Z sufficiently large.
Equation (22) already indicates that contestants with a high level of δ might have an
equilibrium share of zero, i.e. they might prefer to stay non-active. Note that due to
the definitions of AA and ET the order of the contestants according to δPi coincides
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for both policies with the one based on marginal costs because δP1 ≤ δP2 ≤ . . . ≤ δPn .
Now the the set of active contestants M ⊆ N can be characterized, i.e. the m players
with strict positive share in equilibrium. From Eq. (22) it is obvious that in equlibrium
Z∗ < 1/δPi for all i ∈M . Combining Eq. (22) and (23) yields Z∗ = m−1∑
j∈M δ
P
j
. The last
two expressions yield the condition that indirectly defines the set M ⊆ N of active
29It should be obvious that the best response and also the share functions depends on the policy
parameter P . But as the finally implemented policy does not affect the proof of equilibrium
existence and uniqueness, it is suppressed in this section for notational convenience.
30in a weak sense for the AA weights because δAAi = δ
AA
j for i 6= j.
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contestants that consists out of those m contestants with the lowest δ values that
satisfy the following inequality:
(m− 1)δPi <
∑
j∈M
δPj for all i ∈M and for P ∈ {ET,AA} . (24)
From the definition of the share function in Eq. (22) the equilibrium effort level
of contestant i can be calculated as e∗i (P ) = z
∗
i /α
P
i = si(Z
∗)Z∗/αPi . Inserting the
expression for Z∗ leads to Eq. (10).31
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